AutoGen

Every executive agent demo eventually reaches the same awkward moment: the model stops being a chatbot and starts touching things. Files. APIs. Databases. Code runners. Email clients. Payment workflows. Production systems, because apparently we enjoy giving probabilistic text engines access to expensive buttons. The paper Architecting Resilient LLM Agents: A Guide to Secure Plan-then-Execute Implementations argues that the core safety problem is not merely that agents sometimes reason badly. The sharper problem is that many agent architectures let untrusted information change what the agent decides to do next.1 That is a control-flow problem. And control-flow problems are not solved by asking the model, very politely, to behave. ...

TL;DR for operators Chemical-process optimisation does not usually fail because nobody has heard of optimisation. It fails earlier, in the less glamorous swamp where someone has to decide what operating ranges are even allowed. Temperatures, separator conditions, pressure drops, utility trade-offs, convergence behaviour, equipment limits: all the tedious things that make optimisation useful and prevent it from becoming a very fast route to nonsense. ...