TL;DR for operators Marketplace operators usually worry that pricing algorithms learn the oldest trick in commerce: stop undercutting each other and raise prices. That worry is real. But this paper makes a more interesting point: when sellers use algorithms to optimise both product prices and sponsored-ad bids, collusion can move through the cost side before it moves through the price side.1 ...
TL;DR for operators Autonomous agents do not need a smoke-filled room to coordinate. A message channel, persistent memory, a profit-maximising objective, and repeated market interaction can be quite enough. Charming, really. The paper behind this article studies LLM buyers and sellers in a simulated continuous double auction: five buyers, five sellers, 30 rounds, sellers costing each lot at $80, buyers valuing each lot at $100, and a competitive equilibrium at $90.1 Sellers can set asks, buyers can set bids, and trades occur when bids meet asks. The authors then vary the conditions around the agents: whether sellers can message each other, which model powers the sellers, and whether sellers face oversight or CEO-style urgency. ...